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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an inherent tension between environmental legislation
which seeks to impose financial liability on polluters, and the
Bankruptcy Code ("Code")2 which seeks to limit financial liability.
The most important goals underlying the Code are to afford the
debtor a fresh start, rehabilitate financially distressed businesses, and
I

Richard H. Golubow, Law Clerk to the Honorable John J. Wilson, United States

Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California received his J.D. from Southwestern
University School of Law, 1992. The author wishes to thank his wife and best friend,
Rosemarie, for her unconditional and unselfish love and support throughout this and all
other endeavors.
2
The United State Constitution confers upon Congress the power to establish laws
regarding bankruptcy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. In 1978 Congress recodified the
Bankruptcy Act as the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1330 (1979 & Supp. 1992).
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provide equitable distribution of available funds amongst creditors.3
These objectives become feasible4 by limiting liability or maximizing
the scope of a discharge of debt.
The recognition of environmental obligations, although relatively
recent, now represents a well established national public policy of
protecting the public health and safety from past, present, and future
conduct that tends to pollute the environment.5 In addition to
protecting the public from danger, environmental legislation also
seeks to institute remedial measures, including reimbursement of the
full value costs of clean-up, from those responsible for the pollution.
Therefore, when a debtor attempts to use the Code to dodge
liability for environmental clean-up costs, a court is faced with a
decision, political in nature, which requires a choice between two
important competing concerns: the financial health of a debtor, and
assigning the costs of cleanup to the public, an involuntary creditor
of the debtor, in order to protect the public and environment from
pollution. As political questions are generally considered nonjusticiable,6 Congress must enact legislation which apportions
financial responsibility among all entities responsible for
environmental pollution, whether or not such entities are seeking
relief under the Code.
This Article will address the judiciary's struggle to balance the
competing values between the protection afforded to a debtor under
the Code and the protection that environmental legislation is intended
to afford the general public. Specifically addressed will be the
present status of case law and its impact upon environmental law
enforcement as applied to the right of a trustee' or debtor in
3
Richard E. Epling, Impact of EnvironmentalLaw on Bankruptcy Cases, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 69 (1991).
4
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
5
Jonathan K. Van Patten & Richard D. Puetz, Bankruptcy and Environmental
Obligations: The Clash Between Private Relief and Public Policy, 35 S.D. L. REV. 220,
221 (1990).
6
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrtTiONAL LAW § 3-13, at 96 (2d ed. 1988).
7
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1302 (1992), which generally describe the duties of
a bankruptcy trustee for a debtor seeking protection under Ch. 7, 11, or 13. Trustees are
appointed for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases. Trustees are generally not appointed for
reorganization cases since the debtor is considered best suited for running its operations.
In general, the trustee's duties are to gather all the debtor's property, to protect and maintain
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possession8 to abandon contaminated property, the granting of
administrative expense priority to environmental claimants, and
dischargeability of environmental cleanup claims. This Article
proposes a solution to the often confusing and inconsistent case law
by concluding that Congress should affix financial responsibility on
the debtor by amending the relevant statutory provisions to the Code
so as to prevent abandonment of contaminated property and grant
non-dischargeable super-priority status to environmental claims of
governmental entities.

II. COMPETING GOALS OF BANKRUPTCY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The stigma of filing a bankruptcy petition seems to have
disappeared. 9 In fact, filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition" for
reorganization has become a corporate planning device with
tremendous legal and financial versatility." Furthermore, neither
insolvency12 nor a showing of financial distress is required in order
to seek protection under the Code.13 Thus, in addition to the

it, to sell the property for the highest possible price, and to distribute the proceeds among
creditors according to the Code's statutory priorities.
a
See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1992). When a debtor seeks reorganization and files a
Chapter 11 petition, the business continues to operate under the control of the debtor-inpossession ("DIP"). The DIP controls a new legal entity - the estate - and has most rights
and duties of a trustee.
9
Peter Blackman, Bankruptcies in a Box, 10 CAL. LAW. 19 (Dec. 1990).
10 Chapter 11, entitled "Reorganization", is the primary rehabilitation proceeding.
In general, it applies to debtors engaged in business. The goal of Chapter 11 cases is to
rehabilitate a business as a going concern rather than to liquidate it. Analogous to Chapter
11 are Chapters 9, 12, and 13 which respectively set forth the statutory framework for
reorganizing a municipality, a family farmer, or an individual. Although relevant to all such
proceedings, this Article focuses primarily on corporate reorganization and Chapter 7
liquidation.
11 Robert E. Kroll, Strategic Bankruptcy, 8 CAL. LAw. 50 (Sept. 1988).
12
Id. See also Van Patten & Puetz, supra note 4; Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). With the debtor facing mass tort liability for asbestos
exposure, Chapter 11 filing permitted debtor to protect its substantial revenues even though
it had assets far in excess of its liabilities at the time of filing it petition for relief.
13
11 U.S.C. § 109 (1992). As to who may be a debtor, this section is devoid of any
requirement that a debtor (other than a municipality filing for protection under Chapter 9)
be insolvent. See also, Kroll, supra note 11.
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debtor's primary tools of negotiation and litigation for dealing with
an environmental claim, the plausible alternative of bankruptcy also
lurks in the background. 4
In fact, corporate reorganization is widely viewed as a method of
reducing or discharging liability 5 for companies subject to
regulatory actions such as environmental clean-up claims.' 6 This
ability to escape from environmental liability is significant given the
relatively recent Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") study
which concluded that over the next fifty years, nearly thirty percent
owning waste disposal facilities will petition for
of the companies
17
bankruptcy.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
While the Code seeks to limit financial liability, statutes such as
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA")' force polluters to reimburse 9 the full
value of costs expended for cleaning-up despoiled land, air, or water.
CERCLA is primarily a remedial statute designed to address the
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS, Ch.
9 at 746 (2d ed. 1991).
15 Massive non-dischargeable environmental claims may preclude successful
14

rehabilitation of a corporate debtor seeking reorganization with liquidation of the assets
becoming the only feasible alternative. Chapter 7 of the Code relates to liquidation
proceedings. Its purpose is to achieve a fair and equitable distribution to creditors of
whatever non-exempt property the debtor has and to give the debtor a fresh start.
16
See also James N. Cahan, Business Transactions: A Guide through the
Wilderness, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 25, 27 (Summer 1990). The average federal
Superfund site cleanup costs $10 - $30 million, and some are expected to exceed $100
million.
17
U.S. General Accounting Office, Hazardous Waste, Environmental Safeguards
Jeopardized When Facilities Cease Operating, at 18 (1986).
18
42 U.S.C. §§ 9600 - 9675 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
19
In addition to CERCLA, numerous federal environmental statutes force polluters
to reimburse the government for costs of remediation. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control &
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. (1986 & Supp 1991); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. (1986 & Supp 1991); Marine Protection, Research
& Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §1401, et seq. (1986 & Supp 1991); Deepwater Port Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1501, et seq. (1986 & Supp 1991); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201, et
seq. (1986 & Supp 1991); The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. (1983 & Supp
1991).
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environmental problems caused by the past disposal of hazardous
waste.20 Congress, under CERCLA, gave the federal government
the authority to clean-up hazardous waste sites and an $8.5 billion
Superfund to finance that effort.2' The EPA spends approximately
22
$1.5 billion a year in taxpayer dollars on Superfund cleanups.
Upon identification of a release or threatened release of
hazardous waste, the EPA conducts an investigation to determine if
the environmental risk is of sufficient severity to warrant inclusion
of the site on the National Priorities List.23 Thereafter, the EPA
selects an appropriate remedy 2' and can either order the potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs") to take remedial action,25 or take the
remedial action itself, using Superfund monies and seek
reimbursement for the eventual full value cost of remediation 26 from
the broadly defined PRPs27 after the costs have been incurred.
20

See Cahan, supra note 16, at 26.

21

Id.

22

Michael Parrish, The Real Cleanup - Insurers Superfund Focus: Hiring Lawyers,
L.A. TIMES, April 24, 1992, at DI, D2. The EPA has only recovered $295 million from
responsible parties since 1987 and is seeking $1 billion more.
2
Kyle E. McSlarrow, David E. Jones & Eric J. Murdock, A Decade of Superfund
Litigation: CERCLA Case Law From 1981-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367, 10377 (1991).
2A 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). CERCLA authorizes the EPA to take "any ...
response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which [EPA] deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare of the environment [whenever] any
hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such release into the
environment...I Id.
25
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
26
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
27
Potentially responsible parties include:
(1) Owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
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Liability is joint and several28 and the broadly defined PRPs are
strictly liable for the cleanup costs. CERCLA's expansive definition
of liability:
[R]eflects a social decision that those who have profited from
the generation of the wastes, those who may or will have a
windfall profit from the cleanup, and those who are in a
position to prevent such problems in the future should bear
some of the clean-up costs along with those whose actions
actually caused the problem. 9
While Congress has enacted broad sweeping environmental
legislation to protect the public and environment from pollution, the
national environmental policy of cleaning up contaminated property
will be better served if Congress deems it equally important for
governmental agencies to be reimbursed at full value for response
costs based on pollution caused by a bankrupt entity. Essentially, to
label an entity as responsible for cleanup costs does not fully
effectuate the spirit of environmental legislation unless responsibility
includes full value cost replacement by all PRPs.

IV. COMMENCEMENT OF A BANKRUPTCY CASE
Under the Code a bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of
a petition with the bankruptcy court.30 The date of filing the
petition serves as an important benchmark for the determination of
the debtor's and creditor's rights.3 ' At the moment a petition is
substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
Person is defined as "an individual, finn, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of
a State, or any interstate body. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
2
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983),
whereby the court fashioned a judicially created component of CERCLA by relying
principally on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B while establishing a presumption
of joint and several liability.
29 See Cahan, supra note 16.
30
11 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (1988).
31
See Van Patten and Puetz, supra note 5.
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filed an "estate" is created by operation of law just as if a new
corporation had been established.32 The estate is comprised of all
the debtor's legal and equitable interests in its property.33 Also, the
filing of a petition triggers an "automatic stay" that prohibits any
creditor attempts to commence or continue collection from the debtor
or the debtor's property. 34
35
There are several statutory exceptions to the automatic stay.
One significant exception is that the automatic stay does not apply
to the "commencement or the continuation of an action or proceeding
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
regulatory power. 3 6 Furthermore, the automatic stay does not stop
the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment,
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.37
Thus, environmental laws may be enforced against the debtor without
violating the automatic stay so long as the government entity does
not seek enforcement of any money judgment obtained.38

V. RIGHT TO ABANDONMENT OF ESTATE PROPERTY
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Under the Code a trustee is permitted to abandon property that is

U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
Id Subsection (b) provides exceptions to this general rule by excluding any power
that the debtor may exercise solely for another entity, any interest in a nonresidential
property lease that has terminated prior to filing a petition, and the debtor's eligibility to
participate in programs authorized by the Higher Education Act of 1965.
4
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
35
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
36
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988).
37
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988).
3
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that damages
for CERCLA violation may be fixed but not enforced); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. The Dept. of
Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting an exception to stay whereby state
brought suit to compel debtor to comply with a pre-petition consent decree to remedy
environmental pollution despite the fact that compliance required the debtor to expend estate
funds in order to comply).
32

33

11
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"burdensome" or of "inconsequential value" to the estate.39
Abandonment operates to divest the estate of control of the property
and revest the debtor with the property interest as of the date of the
petition.'
Abandonment serves the overriding purpose of
bankruptcy liquidation; the expeditious reduction of the debtor's
money for equitable distribution to creditors. 41 Forcing a trustee to
administer burdensome property contradicts this purpose by stalling
the administration of the estate and draining its assets.
A. The Source of Confusion: Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection
Although § 554 appears broad, the power to abandon burdensome
assets under § 554 is not unlimited. In a 5-4 landmark decision, the
United States Supreme Court in Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection,42 held that a trustee may not abandon a
hazardous waste facility "in contravention of a state statute or
regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or
safety from identified hazards." 43 As the Code does not provide
such an exception to abandonment" the court qualified the power
to abandon which Congress saw as unconditional.45

39

40

11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential
value and benefit to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the
court may order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that
is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate. Id.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377 (1977); S.REp. No. 989, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978); 4 Lawrence P. King, COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 554.02 at 554-

7 (15th ed. 1992).
41 See COLLIER, supra note 40 at
42
474 U.S. 494 (1986).
43

554.01 at 554-2,3.

Id

See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988), supra note 39 and accompanying text. This section
provides the substantive requirements for abandoning estate property. Both this section and
its legislative history are wholly devoid of any exception to abandonment.
45 Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring CongressionalIntent. Eight Years
of Judicial Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 12 (1988).
"
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The Midlantic majority essentially relied on two specious
arguments in denying the trustee's right to abandon contaminated
property. The Court found that under the Bankruptcy Act' case
law had developed restricting the trustee's abandonment power when
necessary to protect state and federal interests.47 The majority
reasoned that "[iln codifying the judicially developed rule of
abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established
corollary that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in
violation of certain state and federal laws. '4 8 Thus, the majority
concluded that had Congress intended for the legislature to change
the interpretation of the judicially developed concept Congress would
have specifically made that intent clear.4 9
Specifically rejected was the argument that if Congress intended
to narrow the scope of § 554, Congress would have expressly
If Congress had intended to change the
provided an exception.
interpretation of a judicially created exception to abandonment, it
needed to make that intent specific.51 Silence in the legislative
history was construed as Congress' intent to continue the pre-Code
limitation under § 554.
In reaching its decision, the majority also relied upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b) (1979)52, which although not directly applying to § 554,
supported its contention that property may not be abandoned in
violation of state laws designed to protect the public health or
safety.53 Congressional intent, the majority reasoned, was not

46
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 underwent major revisions and was
recodified as the Bankruptcy Code.
47
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500-01.
48 Id at 501.
49
Id.
50
Id at 515. Then Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, sought a strict
constructionist approach to § 554, which does not provide any exceptions to abandonment.
Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
51
Id at 502.
52
This section provides in pertinent part: [A] trustee ... shall manage and operate
the property in his possession .. .according to the requirements of the valid laws of the
State in which such property is situated ......
53
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.

109

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

preemption of all state laws 5' that otherwise constrains the exercise
of a trustee's powers. 5
Both arguments relied upon by the majority are problematic as
each violates rudimentary principles of statutory interpretation.
When the Supreme Court is to interpret a statute enacted by
Congress, the Court's mandate is clearly to determine Congressional
intent and give effect to that intent. 6 Reference to a statute's
legislative history is the best method by which a court can ascertain
legislative intent.57
Since the legislative history of § 554(a) is silent with respect to
restricting the power to abandon,5 8 any judicially developed
limitation on a trustee's abandonment power is clearly contrary to the
legislative intent on the right to abandon. 9 Had Congress intended
to limit the trustee's abandonment powers it would have done so
when codifying the pre-Code judicially created power to abandon in
1978, or at anytime thereafter.' However, the "plain meaning" and
the legislative history place no limits on abandonment under §
554.61
Also, the Court's reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) violated
principles of statutory construction since a statutory exception is
considered as a limitation only on the matter which directly precedes
While this may be true, the effect of the state law was inconsistent with the aim
of the Code. When a state law conflicts with federal law, the Supremacy Clause, art. IV,
§ 2, dictates that federal law will govern. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat)
316 (1819).
5
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
56
Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
57
See Klee & Merola, supra note 45, at 3.
58
"This section authorizes the court to authorize the trustee to abandon any property
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
Abandonment may be to any party with a possessory interest in the property abandoned."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
92 (1978) (emphasis added).
59
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 509-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Klee & Merola,
supra note 45, at 8.
60
Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs, and
Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State EnvironmentalLaw-Perceived Conflicts and
Optionsfor the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & CoM. 65, 78 (1987).
"The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was a complete recodification of bankruptcy law. If
Congress desired to place limitations on abandonment.., it knew how to do so." Id.
61
Id at 67. See also supra note 57.
54
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it.62 While the intent of Congress regarding those businesses which
continue to operate may be inferred from § 959(b), there is nothing
sufficiently conclusive about that statute as it applies to the scope of
a trustee's right to abandon property from an estate liquidating its
assets.
In fact, § 959(b) does not even indirectly apply to
abandonment since a trustee does not manage or operate property he
intends to abandon.63
Strictly construed, Midlantic imposes an affirmative duty upon
trustees to cleanup contaminated property regardless of the
availability of estate funds." This effectively creates a judicially
prescribed priority for state authorities over other creditor classes by
converting cleanup costs into administrative expenses payable before
final distribution of assets to creditors.65 Such a measure is
unsupported by any bankruptcy statute.'
B. The State of Confusion: Midlantic and Its Aftermath
Extensive case law has developed with a split of authority as to
what is required under Midlantic. Some courts have interpreted
Midlantic to require strict compliance with applicable environmental
laws prior to abandonment.67 Other courts have relied on the more
2A SurHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 47.11 (5th ed. 1992). Only if clearly indicated
will an exception operate as a limitation on an entire act. In essence, exceptions are not to
be implied unless an absurd result is reached by a literal construction of the statute.
6
See Laura Jacobs Margulies, Note, Bankruptcy - Trustee May Not Abandon
Property in Contraventionof a State Statute or Regulation That is Designed to Protect the
Public from Identified Hazards, 17 U. BAIT. L. REV. 558, 563 (1988). Traditionally,
§959(b) applied only to Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings and not to Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings.
64
See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 60, at 67.
6
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6
11 U.S.C. § 726 (1979) which prescribes the order of payment of estate funds for
Chapter 7 liquidation is wholly devoid of any contaminated cleanup priority. See Richard
Marshack, The Toxic Claim: Using Bankruptcy Law to Limit Environmental Liabilities, 19
CAL. BANKR. J. No. 3, 193, 204 (1991).
6
See, e.g., In re Anthony Ferrante & Sons, Inc., 119 B.R. 45 (D. N.M. 1990)
(holding that trustee may not abandon property in contravention of state law unless the state
law is not reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety, the state law is so
onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself or the violation caused by
abandonment would merely be speculative or indeterminate or would not create a risk of
imminent and identifiable harm); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987) (noting that
PCB-contaminated waste oil could not be abandoned by trustee where abandonment of
62
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restrictive language set forth in footnote 9" of the opinion and
narrowly interpret Midlantic such that the exception to abandonment
applies only where there is imminent and identifiable harm to the
public health and safety and the estate has unencumbered assets with
which to finance a cleanup effort.69 Therefore, a trustee may
abandon property even if there is an imminent and identified risk of
harm to the public health and safety when there are insufficient estate
assets to remediate contamination.70
In Microfab, the court found that the State of Massachusetts
failed to demonstrate that the Chapter 7 trustee would achieve
"appreciable results" with the available estate assets.71 The court
held that a " ... trustee need not expend estate assets on a remediation
effort where he does not have sufficient resources to achieve

drums would threaten public safety and contravene state laws reasonably designed to protect
public).
6
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507, n.9. The Court stated:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by
Section 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or
indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from
abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or
regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or
safety from imminent and identifiable harm. Id.
9
See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988) Chapter 11
debtor allowed to abandon a contaminated fertilizer plant since the violations of state and
federal environmental regulations did not pose an imminent threat of harm to the public, the
estate had no unencumbered assets with which to finance a cleanup and the first priority
lienholder on the property consented to the abandonment; In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63
B.R. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) Trustee was allowed to abandon contaminated property
since the estate lacked funds to pay for the cleanup and there was no imminent danger to
the public or the environment; In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D.
Wisc. 1989) Abandonment was allowed where the estate had few unencumbered assets and
there was no imminent danger to the public; In re FCX, Inc., 96 BR. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1989) The court disallowed abandonment because there existed danger to the public and
there was evidence of available funds to pay for cleanup costs. Cf.In re Franklin Signal
Corp., 65 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (holding where the total cost to eliminate the
immediate danger was $500, the trustee was permitted to abandon fourteen drums of
hazardous material which posed no imminent or serious danger to the public after the trustee
reported to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources his intention of abandoning the
property).
70
In re Microfab, 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
71
Id. at 166.
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appreciable results. 7 2 In support of its determination, the court
relied upon then Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in
Midlantic73 and said that "no court of equity can require a trustee
simply to throw away money even in the name of a worthy
cause."74
One could hardly disagree with this sweeping statement when
upholding the often cited goal of bankruptcy law; to afford the debtor
a fresh start.75 Yet, while the Microfab court's decision affords the
debtor a fresh start, this decision is at odds with the national
environmental policy enunciated by Congress to expeditiously
cleanup polluted property and force polluters to reimburse the full
value of costs expended in cleaning-up despoiled land, air or
water.76
C. Eliminating the Source of Confusion
Since Midlantic was decided by an equally divided court, similar
facts before today's Supreme Court would probably render a different
result. 77 Furthermore, recent case law supports the contention that
the Supreme Court, in interpreting the "plain meaning" of the Code,
will look no further than the actual Code and any accompanying
legislative history.
In the recent case of Union Bank v. Wolas,7 8 the court was faced
with the issue of whether long and short term debt payments may
qualify for the ordinary course of business exception to the trustee's
power to avoid preferential transfers.79 Justice Stevens, writing for

72

Id.

Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 514. "The Bankruptcy Court may not, in the exercise of
its equitable powers enforce its view of sound public policy at the expense of the interests
the Code it is designed to protect." Id.
74
In re Microfab, 105 B.R. at 169.
75
See supra note 2.
76
See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
"
Three of the five justices accounting for the Midlantic majority, Justices Powell,
Brennan and Marshall, have since retired and have been replaced by Justices Kennedy,
Souter and Thomas.
7
__ U.S. __ 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
79
11 U.S.C. § 547 (1979). A trustee or DIP has the avoiding power to dismantle
certain transactions between the debtor and creditors that took place within the 90 days (I
year for insiders as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1979)) of filing a bankruptcy petition.
73
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a unanimous Court held that since § 547(c)(2) ° contains no
language distinguishing between long and short term debt, payments
on long-term debt, as well as those on short term debt, may qualify
for the ordinary course of business exception to the trustee's power
to avoid preferential transfers.81
The Court explicitly rejected the respondent's argument that the
transfer was preferential since there is no evidence in the legislative
history that Congress did not intend to make the ordinary course of
business exception not available to conventional long term lenders.8 2
Crucial to the Court's holding was the "plain language
concept." 3 The Court reasoned that "[t]he fact that Congress may
not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is
not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain
In fact, during oral argument before the Supreme
meaning."
Court, one of the justices commented that the "only way Congress
could have made the language of § 547 any clearer would have been
to add the words 'and we really mean it' to the end of the
statute." 5
The "plain meaning" rationale of Union Bank is wholly

The purpose of avoiding such transactions is to achieve the policy of equality of distribution
among the debtor's creditors. Although Union Bank dealt with preferential transfers, both
it and Midlantic were decided based upon statutory interpretation of the Code.
so Under II U.S.C. § 547(c) (1979) the trustee may not avoid a transfer (2) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course
of business or financial affairs of the debtor and transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to the ordinary business terms. Id.
81 Union Bank, _ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. at 533.
82
Id. at 531-32.
83
High Court "Preference"ForPlain Language Focus of FebruaryForum, ORANGE
CoUNTY BANKR. F. NEWS, Vol. 2, Feb. 1992, at 3.
8
Union Bank, _ U.S. ___ 112 S.Ct. at 531 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, _ U.S.
.
111 S.Ct. 2197 (1991) (the Bankruptcy Code's plain language permits individual
debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11) (emphasis added).
85
See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Recount of oral argument by John A.
Graham, Esq. of Frandzel & Share, attorneys for petitioner Union Bank, at February 11,
1992 Orange County Bankruptcy Forum meeting.
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inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the Midlantic
majority" and could very well be considered the modem Court's
statutory analysis of the Code. 7 In fact, one could hardly argue
that when the Supreme Court eventually grants certiorari" for a suit
regarding abandonment of a bankrupt's contaminated estate property,
either Midlantic will be limited to its facts89 or then Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Midlantic will be adopted by a
majority of the Court.90 Overruling Midlantic would be consistent

86

__

U.S.

__

112 S.Ct. at 534. In a scathing concurring opinion, Justice Scalia

sharply rebuked the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and said:
It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such arguments
have to be addressed (and indeed credited by a Court of Appeals), with
respect to a statute utterly devoid of language that could remotely be
thought to distinguish between long-term and short-term debt. Since
there was no "scrivener's error" producing an absurd result, the plain
text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary and
unmaintainable. Id.
8
See Patterson v. Shumate, _
U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 2242 (1992) The Court held
that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of Code § 541(c)(2) excluding from the
estate debtor's interest in property subject to restriction on transfer enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law, was not limited to state law, and it included ERISA and other federal
law. The Court looked to the "plain language" of the Code and reasoned that "[tihe text [of
the Code] contains no limitation on 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' relating to the source
of the law." Id. at 2246.
a'
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988) grants the Supreme Court the authority to hear cases
by writ of certiorari. See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 10.3.2, at 504
(1989) The writ of certiorari is issued in order that the Court may inspect the lower court's
proceedings and determine whether there have been any irregularities. The writ is most
commonly used as a discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear. The process
of appeals to the Supreme Court were largely eliminated in 1988 by Pub. L. No. 100-352,
102 Stat. 662 (1988).
89
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499, n.3. Justice Powell chastised the lower courts' failure
"to take even relatively minor steps to require the trustee to reduce imminent danger, such
as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing
explosive agents . . . [and implementing] security measures that prevent public entry,
vandalism, and fire." See also, Morris G. Shanker, A Bankruptcy Supefundfor Some Super
Creditors,61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185, 187 (1987) in which the author contends that requiring
the debtor to pay the cost of only those "relatively minor steps" may be all that Justice
Powell had in mind.
90
Justice Rehnquist recognized that in an egregious situation some limits could be
placed on the trustee's abandonment power. One scenario, would be where a particular
situation "might create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be uniquely able to guard
against ... [such as] dynamite sitting on the furnace in the basement of a schoolhouse."
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 515.
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with the Court's relatively low regard for upholding prior case law
simply based upon principles of stare decisis. 9'
D. Proposed Statutory Amendment
While Midlantic may eventually be overruled, it is still the
leading case as to the legality of a bankruptcy trustee's right to
abandon contaminated estate property. Midlantic, however, failed to
address the source of cleanup costs. 92 Generally, costs to cleanup
an abandoned hazardous waste facility are borne by a government
agency. 93 More accurately, these costs are borne by the taxpayer the involuntary creditor - whose dollars are used to fund the
governmental agencies.
Essentially, the lower courts have been faced with the public
policy choice of whether the general population should become the
involuntary creditor of a debtor who has failed to abide by
environmental legislation or whether the involuntary creditor should
be entitled to priority over the claims of the voluntary business
creditors. 94 Unlike the voluntary creditor, the involuntary creditor:
(1) Did not choose to deal with or extend credit to the
bankrupt, (2) did not intend to take the risk of his insolvency,
(3) had no advantage or profit to gain from becoming a
creditor of the bankrupt, and (4) had no way of insisting upon
cash or security before the debt was incurred.95
However, if a trustee's right to abandonment under the Code is
91

In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the

Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, (1976) and held that in affording SAMTA employees the protection of the wage and
hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress contravened no affirmative limit
on its power under the Commerce Clause. Several justices warned explicitly that they
expected National League of Cities would rise again. Specifically, then Justice Rehnquist
contended that he thought "it incumbent on those of us in the dissent to spell out further the
fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support of
a majority of this Court." Id. at 580.
92
See Marshack, supra note 66, at 202.
93
Id. at 198.
94
See Shanker, supra note 89, at 193.
95 Id.
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construed so as to create limits to its full force and effect when faced
with environmental legislation and cleanup efforts, the remedy is for
Congress, and not the courts, to make exceptions to the Code to
achieve the national objectives that Congress chooses to reach.
Therefore, interpreting the Code to permit restrictions on a
trustee's right to abandon property is insufficient because the Code
does not provide for any exception.96 The solution proposed is
amendment of § 554(a) so that Congress explicitly prohibits
abandonment of property of an estate which is subject to a state or
federal environmental claim.97
To allow abandonment of contaminated estate property
disproportionatelyimposes the burden of cleanup on the involuntary
creditors of the estate.98 In essence, the voluntary creditors
benefitted from its business dealings with the debtor as the true cost
to produce a given product based upon the resulting hazardous waste
which was never factored into the cost equation. The result was
reduced costs of production which, if the debtor had been
environmentally responsible, would have been attributed to remediate
the pollution. Thus, to allow the voluntary creditors the use of such
monies is to give those creditors a windfall profit at the expense of
the involuntary creditors.

9
9

See supra note 39.
11 U.S.C. § 554 as proposed would read (with the new language emphasized):

(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate,
not subject to a state or federal environmental claim, that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may
order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate, not subject to a state or
federal environmental claim, that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. Id.
98
But see Grace C. Yeh, Note, Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection: Has the Supreme Court "Abandoned" Section 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code? 6 UCLA J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 205, 222 (1987). The author contends
that although both the creditors and the government are innocent parties, disallowing
abandonment disproportionately imposes the burden on the creditors who are not directly
benefitted by the cleanup. The residents of a state, however, receive a direct benefit because
they now have a cleaner state.
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VI. DEFINING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP CLAIM:
A MATTER OF PRIORITY
Only those who hold "claims" against the debtor or the estate can
share in the distribution of the estate as creditors." The Code
defines a claim as "a right to payment" or "a right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right
to payment."'"
When a right or potential right becomes a claim is an important
and difficult question. If the claim arose before the debtor filed its
petition, the claim is considered to have arisen pre-petition. An
environmental pre-petition claim is generally unsecured, paid pro-rata
with all other pre-petition unsecured claims, and subject to
discharge.'
If the claim arose after the petition was filed, it is considered
post-petition and afforded administrative expense priority, not subject
to discharge,"0 2 since such claims would be for "actual and

9
George M. Treister, Et. al. FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUFrCY LAw, § 6.01 at 267
(2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1990).
1o0 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1979). In this title (5) "claim" means(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. Id.
101 See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that environmental agency
is a general unsecured claimant as it sought an order compelling the debtor to cleanup prepetition pollution); Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d. Cir.
1985) (explaining that pollution caused by debtor renders creditor asserting claim for
cleanup an unsecured claimant); In re Pierce Coal and Constr., Inc., 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr.
N.D. W. Va. 1986) (noting that claim for damages which occurred prior to filing petition
are pre-petition unsecured claims). But see In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 B.R. 912
(Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 1989) (holding that since the court could not accurately determine which
environmental releases occurred pre-petition and which occurred post-petition, the EPA was
afforded administrative priority for all response costs incurred).
102
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (1979), which provides that as a precondition to a
Chapter 11 plan confirmation, all administrative claims must be paid in full.
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necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.""0 3
Numerous cases have afforded private citizens °4 and governmental
agencies' 0 5 administrative expense priority for their environmental
claims against bankrupt estates.
Neatly categorizing when the act of pollution actually occurred
has been troublesome for many courts and has led to inconsistent
results.'0 As a result, there is a split of authority as to defining
when a cleanup claim arises.

103

11

U.S.C.A. § 507 (1979) in pertinent part provides: "(a) The following expenses

and claims have priority in the following order: (1) First, administrative expenses allowed
under Section 503(b) of this title...." Id.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1979) in pertinent part provides: "(b) After notice and a hearing,
there shall be allowed administrative expenses ... including - (1)(A) the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate ..
" Id.
104
See, e.g., In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 126 B.R. 656 (D. Mass. 1991) modifying
108 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (holding that post-petition purchaser of contaminated
estate property was entitled to reimbursement of cleanup costs as an administrative expense
priority); In re Kent Holland Die Casting and Plating, Inc., 126 B.R. 733 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(explaining that a lessor has administrative priority for costs incurred in disposing of
hazardous waste arising from post-petition breach of an assumed contract but lessor had only
an unsecured claim for pre-petition costs of remediation). But see In re Dant & Russell, Inc.,
853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988), where conduct giving rise to cleanup costs occurred prepetition, lessor was not entitled to administrative expense priority.
105 See, e.g., In re Vernon Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 B.R. 580 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988), where administrative priority for cleanup costs would benefit the estate based upon
compliance with state environmental law and protect the public from identified harm; In re
Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987), where costs of protecting the public from the danger
of hazardous waste entitled creditors to administrative priority. See also In re Bill's Coal
Co., Inc., 124 B.R. 827 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding state agency afforded administrative
expense priority for $560,580 in civil penalties against debtor based upon court's
determination that the payment of civil penalties is a cost of compliance and there is no
compelling reason to distinguish between compensatory and non-compensatory penalties
when determining whether or not a claim should be allowed as an administrative expense).
106
See Marshack, supra note 66, at 205; Epling, supra note 2.
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A. When Response Costs Have Been Incurred
Some courts do not look to the debtor's underlying conduct as
sufficient to create a contingent "right to payment".'0 7 Courts
following this approach recognize that there can be no "claim" until
response costs have been incurred. '0 8 This approach presumes that
there is no claim until all conditions have occurred that are necessary
to impose legal liability upon the debtor.1°9 This interpretation,
however, conflicts with the Code's definition which includes those
claims that are contingent 1 since, by definition, contingent claims
involve a condition precedent to liability that has not yet
occurred."' Courts following this approach have been criticized
for their failure to effectuate the legislative intent of broadly defining
a claim under the Code."' Additionally, this methodology has
been rejected by numerous courts for its failure to distinguish
between when a cause of
action arises as opposed to when a claim
3
Code."
the
arises under
Courts that treat environmental claims as arising when response

107

108

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Wall Tube and Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987),

where post-petition costs incurred by a state environmental protection agency were
recoverable as administrative expense claims, even though the waste was generated prepetition; United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990)
(holding that a claim arises when the EPA spends money to cleanup a site).
109 See Treister, et al, supra note 99, at 269. In the controversial case of Matter of
M. Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), the court held that an accountant's post-petition
cross-complaint against the debtor for contribution and indemnity based upon pre-petition
negligence in preparing financial statements was a post-petition claim since the indemnity
claim did not arise under state law until after the accountants were sued.
110 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
III See Treister, et. al., supra note 99, at 269.
112
The legislative history provides: "By the broadest possible definition [of a claim]
the bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent [will] be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 309 reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6266.
113 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 127 B.R. 27, 32-3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), (noting that a
California Department of Health Services' "claim" arose upon conduct which gave rise to
a cause of action and not when the actual funds were expended); In re A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a user of Dalkon Shield had "claim"
although injury not apparent from use of shield); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680,
686-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining that those exposed to asbestos have "claims"
despite the absence of manifest injury).
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costs are incurred place the EPA in the precarious position of waiting
to expend funds for remediation. The EPA is aware that if it
expends funds pre-petition its claim may be subject to discharge.
However, if the EPA waits until the petition is filed before it expends
the cleanup costs, it will be entitled to administrative expense
priority. Although such a tactical strategy conflicts with the national
policy of swift remediation of environmental pollution,1 14 this
strategy promotes the national environmental policy of holding those
potentially responsible parties liable for full value cleanup costs.
This approach, however, undermines the Code's goal of affording the
debtor a fresh start since the debtor, despite filing for protection
under the Code, will invariably be saddled with what could be a
massive environmental claim.
B. Release or Threatened Release of Hazardous Substances
Alternatively, some courts' inquiry is directed at when the release
15
or threatened release of hazardous substances actually occurred.1
The reach of this inquiry is broad and includes liabilities arising from
pre-petition acts or omissions of the debtor, regardless of when the
harm actually manifests itself."6
The leading case to determine that an environmental claim arises
when the release or threatened release of hazardous substances has
occurred is In re Chateaugay Corp."7 In Chateaugay, the EPA
and New York State sought declaratory judgments as to the
dischargeability of environmental claims in the reorganization
proceeding of LTV Steel Co., Inc.
Although the EPA did not yet know the full extent of costs that
it might one day incur and seek to impose upon the debtor, nor did
the EPA even know the location of all sites at which hazardous
wastes might be found, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
response costs incurred by the EPA under CERCLA were pre-petition
"claims" dischargeable in bankruptcy, regardless of when such costs

See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1991).
116
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
11
944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
14
15
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were incurred, so long as such costs concerned a release or
threatened release of hazardous waste that occurred before the debtor
filed its Chapter 11 petition."' However, the court also held that
an injunction that imposes obligations having to do with stopping or
limiting ongoing pollution is not dischargeable.
The court based its opinion on the evident intent of Congress " 9
"to apply broadly the definition of 'claim'. ' 20 Although the EPA's
claim was not liquidated, the court recognized that contingent claims
may be estimated if their liquidation "would unduly delay the
administration of the case.' ' 12' Nothing, the court said, prevents the
speedy and rough estimation of CERCLA claims for purposes of
determining the EPA's voice in the Chapter 11 proceeding."
The Chateaguaydecision is problematic in that the court attempts
to neatly delineate when and to what extent pollution has occurred
pre as opposed to post-petition. This task is, at best, a difficult one
as the same source of pollution which may have occurred years ago
continues to seep into and pollute the same soil and water.
Courts following Chateaugay will encourage potential debtors to
notify the EPA and all applicable state environmental agencies of any
potential pollution. 123 The effect being that such claims would be
considered unsecured, pre-petition and subject to discharge. Prior to
notifying the applicable governmental. agencies, the debtor could

118 Id. at 1005-06.
119 See supra notes 100, 112 and accompanying text.
120 Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1005-06.
121
Id.
Id
122
123 Although the Chateaugaydecision seems to also encourage a debtor to do nothing
and simply claim that any pollution that it has emitted was generated pre-petition, the
prudent debtor is advised to list all of the environmental agencies as creditors when it files
its "list of creditors" as required by 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 1111 (1988). This would avoid
any possible due process concerns based upon the EPA (or any state agencies) not being
aware of its status as a creditor of the estate. See, e.g., Sylvester Bros. Dev. v. Burlington
N. R.R., 133 B.R. 648 (D. Minn. 1991), where the Chapter 11 debtor failed to disclose its
potential state or federal environmental law liability and the enforcement agency did not
obtain actual knowledge of the potential claim in time to file a proof of claim, the liability
was not discharged by confirmation of the plan of reorganization even though the agency
was aware of the bankruptcy proceeding. See also Reliable Electric Co., Inc. v. Olson
Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the due process clause prevented
discharging a claim when the creditor, who was aware of the bankruptcy case, failed to
receive notice of the hearing on confirmation).
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subsequently file for bankruptcy thereby relieving itself from the risk
of being subjected to pre-petition costs or post-petition administrative
expense priority costs for remediation.
C. Actual and Necessary Costs and Expenses of
Preserving the Estate
While the first two approaches to defining when a claim arises
focuses on the timing of the claim, a third approach has developed
whereby many courts tend to give pre-petition claims for cleanup an
administrative expense priority if doing so would protect the public
from imminent and identifiable harm.124 A determination that postpetition clean-up costs incurred by a state agency for waste generated
pre-petition draws support from the Supreme Court's decision in
Midlantic. It has been reasoned that according to Midlantic, since a
trustee cannot abandon property in contravention of a state law
designed to protect the public health and safety, it must then follow
that expenses to remove the threat posed by such substances are
necessary to preserve the estate. The effect of this is to afford
administrative expense priority for environmental claims which occur
pre or post-petition so long as response costs were incurred after the
debtor filed its petition.' 25

VII. DISCHARGEABILITY OF AN
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIM
Closely related to the concept of when an environmental claim
arises in bankruptcy is whether an environmental claim may be
a fresh start is
discharged. The Code's goal of affording the debtor
126
Code.
the
of
provisions
discharge
the
in
embodied

124

See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1010 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Smith-

Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831
F.2d 118, 123-24 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948-49 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987).
125
See supra note 124.
See Epling, supra note 3; 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141 (1988).
126
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A. Chapter 7
Under Chapter 7 of the Code a pre-petition order requiring
cleanup which may be reduced to a monetary judgment is a claim
subject to discharge.' 27 An environmental claim, however, may be
declared nondischargeable if the debtor was engaged in conduct or
actions which28 satisfy the grounds for nondischargeability as set forth
1
in § 523(a).
One example of nondischargeability is found in In re Berry.'29
The court held that the debtor's abandonment of dangerous chemicals
in uncovered vats, and its failure to properly contain the chemicals
constituted willful and malicious conduct, rendering the debt
nondischargeable. 130 However, the case is limited to facts which
the court characterized as egregious conduct. While the Code
appears to provide a discharge in a broad range of circumstances,
there are no Code provisions which specifically make an
3
environmental claim nondischargeable.' '
B. Chapter 11
A significant effect of confirmation of a plan of reorganization in
a Chapter 11 case is that the debtor is discharged from debts that

127

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985), where injunction ordering estate to cleanup

hazardous waste is a dischargeable claim since the only performance sought from the debtor
was the payment of money; United States v. Whizco, 841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988), where
mandatory injunctive relief requires a debtor to spend money, a dischargeable claim exists;
In re Robinson, 46 B.R. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1985) (holding that a debtor is permitted to
discharge duty to restore certain marshlands since performance is based upon an expenditure
of money); In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991), where debtor caused or
threatened to cause pre-petition contamination, the state environmental agency's claim for
response costs was subject to discharge even if the agency had not discovered the pollution
and had not incurred response costs pre-petition.
128
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988). Grounds for nondischargeability include obligations
arising for certain taxes owed, fraudulently incurred obligations, debts not timely scheduled,
fiduciary fraud, larceny, embezzlement, spousal and child support, willful and malicious
injuries, governmental fines and penalties, certain educational loans, drunk driving
judgments, and debts involved in a prior bankruptcy case. Id.
129
84 B.R. 717 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987).
130
Id at 721.
131
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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arose prior to confirmation.' 32 A discharge voids judgments with
respect to any debt discharged and enjoins all actions to collect a
discharged debt from the debtor. 33 Courts are split as to whether
a corporate debtor seeking reorganization may discharge an
environmental cleanup claim. The courts' analysis is primarily based
a
upon the timing of a claim and whether or not they believe that
34
cleanup claim is an actual and necessary expense of the estate'
Courts which define a claim as arising when response costs have
been incurred will bifurcate those claims for which response costs
have been incurred from those claims for which response costs have
yet to be incurred. 35 Alternatively, courts which define a claim as
arising when there is a release or threatened release of hazardous
waste will generally provide that a pre-petition release may be
discharged. 36 Lastly, pre and post-petition releases will, in
general, be construed according to Midlantic such that where there
is imminent and identifiable harm, remediation costs will be afforded
priority as necessary expenses to preserve the
administrative
37
estate. 1

132

11

U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1988) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the
date of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in
section 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of this title, whether or not -

133
134
135
136
137

(i) a proof of claim based on such debt is filed or
deemed filed under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; and
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity security holders and
general partners provided for by the plan. Id.
11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
See supra notes 108 -114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 125.
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C. ProposedStatutory Amendment
Congress should not reward polluters who improperly dispose of
waste by allowing them to seek protection under the Code. Congress
must implement national public environmental policy and promote
companies that are fiscally and environmentally sound. This may be
achieved by using the private sector to enforce the public policy of
a clean and safe environment.
To "socialize" the cost of cleanup is a quick-fix solution since it
is very easy to place the financial burdens on all. Although the end
result may be to force certain companies out of business, in the long
run, their elimination would reduce the costs to society for
environmental cleanup efforts by more accurately reflecting the true
cost of pollution. 38
Therefore, Congress may put an end to this confusing and often
inconsistent case law by amending the Code such that pre and postpetition state or federal environmental claims are nondischargeable.13 9 Although the Code and environmental legislation
are sometimes at odds, this solution would help effectuate the
national environmental policy of holding all potentially responsible
parties liable for clean-up costs.

VIII. FEDERAL SUPERLIENS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS
By statute, each state and the United States Government may
protect their interest in the enforcement of environmental protection

138

Charles Openchowski, Bankruptcy Is Not An Answer: A Rebuttal, 15 ENVTL. L.

REP. 10314 (1985).
139
11 U.S.C. §523(a) as proposed would read (with inserted new language
emphasized):
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- .
(13)for any pre orpost-petitionstate orfederal environmental claim whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidateat unliquidated,matured,
unmatured, contingent, secured or unsecured. Id.
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laws by providing clean-up expenses with super-priority status."'
In order to give priority to environmental concerns, superlien
legislation has been enacted in several states. 4 ' A superlien
accords a state priority over previously recorded interests to secure
all costs expended to clean up a contaminated site. Also, a superlien
may encumber all property owned by the entity from whom
collection is4 2sought, not just the property on which the cleanup was
performed.
Under CERCLA, the federal government is afforded a lien in
favor of the United States for "all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States" on all affected real property that
belongs to the liable party." 3

However, these liens are of rather

dubious value since they are subject to the rights of any prior
purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien creditor, as
perfected under state law. 144
Therefore, Congress must, as a matter of public policy, initiate
legislation which integrates environmental issues into all levels of
business negotiations. Instead of placing the responsibility on
governmental agencies to police businesses which pollute the
environment 45 the most potent way to enforce environmental
legislation is to implement a broad sweeping federal super-priority
140
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See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 60, at 68.
See, e.g., Arkansas Emergency Response Fund Act and Remedial Trust Fund Act,

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-7-415 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1991); Connecticut Hazardous Waste
Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-452a (West 1985 & Supp. 1992); Massachusetts Oil
and Hazardous Materials Release Prevention and Response Act, MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 21E, § 13 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); New Hampshire Solid and Hazardous Waste
Management Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147B:10-6 (1990 & Supp. 1991); New Jersey's
Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1992); Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-209
(1987 & Supp. 1991).
142
Ronald G. Todd, Handling Environmental Law Concerns in Real Estate
Transactions, 19 REAL EST. REV. 76, 85 (Spring 1988).
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42 U.S.C. §9607(1) (1988).
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See Todd, supra note 141.
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See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 60, at 68. The authors suggest that
government can achieve the same results that statutory judgments provide by strengthening
their licensing, bonding, and policing of businesses which pollute the environment. See also,
S. Scott Massin, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste,
19 ENVrL. L. REP. 10427 (1989), where "government can help to avoid the [conflict
between environmental law and bankruptcy law] through vigorous environmental
enforcement of ongoing, industrial operations ..
" Id.
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environmental lien that trumps all liens whether preexisting or not.
It is important for Congress, in providing for a federal superlien,
to institute adequate procedural safeguards so that the lien could not
be attacked as an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process. 1" If denied due process, a trustee or debtor-in-possession
may seek to invalidate CERCLA liens imposed on contaminated
property prior to filing for protection, thereby rendering the EPA a
general unsecured creditor for pre-petition cleanup costs.
The practical effect of a federal superlien would be to force
lenders to take a proactive role in enforcing environmental
legislation. A lender will know that if a borrower does not comply
with environmental legislation, the lender's perfected security interest
will be primed by federal legislation. 47
For example, consider the large lender who takes a security
interest in the debtor's property. As part of the transaction, lenders
should protect their interests by including covenants in the security
agreement which provide that failure to comply with state and federal
environmental statutes are tantamount to a breach of contract in

146

In the recent non-bankruptcy case of Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st

Cir. 1991), the court held that the filing of a lien under CERCLA, without prior notice and
a hearing in which the landowner could contest both the reasonableness and propriety of the
lien, constitutes a taking of a property interest which is protected by the due process clause
of the United States Constitution. The court relied principally upon the Supreme Court
decision in Connecticut v. Doehr, __ U.S. __, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991), whereby a state
prejudgment attachment statute was held unconstitutional despite the fact that an ex parte
hearing was required prior to attachment.
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Until recently, substantial involvement by a lender or other creditor in this manner
was not without risk. Under CERCLA, the term "owner or operator" exempts one who
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest, where that is done
"without participating in the management of the facility." 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A) (1988).
However, in the case of United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir.
1990), cert. denied, _ U.S. __, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals implied that a secured lender who had the "capacity to influence" a borrower's
environmental management of hazardous materials could lose that exemption from CERCLA
liability. As a result, questions regarding the judicial interpretation of this "security interest"
exemption generated uncertainty within the financial and lending communities for the
purpose of protecting a security interest without incurring CERCLA liability. In response
to Fleet Factors, the EPA clarified the safe harbor for a secured lender from CERCLA
liability by promulgating Subpart I, Lender Liability Under CERCLA, to the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. §300.1100). Under the new rule lenders can, inter alia,freely enforce
and monitor debtor environmental cleanups as loan conditions or terms.
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which the secured party/lender may foreclose on the property. In
order to comply with the security agreement, the lender will require
periodical environmental audits to ensure compliance. Such private
policing will further the national environmental policy of early
detection of pollution as well as swift remediation and reduced costs.
The effect will be for creditors to increase their oversight of the
facility's operations in order to limit the debtor's environmental
liability exposure while affording some relief to the already
overburdened public enforcement agencies.

IX. CONCLUSION
Environmental legislation is intended to ensure compliance with
the national policy of minimizing the threat which hazardous wastes
pose to the public health and to the environment. However, the Code
has been used to trump this national public policy based upon
judicially created doctrine which frustrates the goals of environmental
legislation. This impedes the strong national public policy of
regulating substances which may adversely affect the public health
or the environment.
In effect, courts have been faced with the policy choice of
whether the public, as an involuntary creditor, should be held liable
for environmental remediation costs or whether other potentially
responsible private entities should shoulder the responsibility.
Congress must enact legislation which apportions financial
responsibility with all entities responsible for environmental
pollution, whether or not such entities are seeking relief under the
Code. Therefore, Congress should affix financial responsibility on
the debtor by amending the relevant statutory provisions to the Code
so as to prevent abandonment of contaminated property and grant
non-dischargeable super-priority status to environmental claims of
governmental entities. The effect of ensuring the government a
super-priority for clean-up costs will force lenders to be proactive in
policing their debtors' environmental liabilities since a large superpriority claim could leave little or nothing for secured creditors
primed by such a lien.

